McCain's 'Hard Call' Provides Invaluable Insight

For his most recent book, Republican presidential candidate, and presumptive nominee, Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.) decided to eschew something autobiographical in favor of a collection of historical “episodes, ” which he titles, Hard Call: Great Decisions and the Extraordinary People who Made Them. Each of these focuses on a specific public figure and a difficult decision that he or she had to make. Some of these decisions McCain colors as triumphs of the human intellect, others as disasters. These “episodes” are organized into six different themes: awareness, foresight, timing, confidence, humility and inspiration.

Although many of these stories are fairly “safe” – such as Lincoln’s decision to sign the Emancipation Proclamation and Branch Rickey’s decision to integrate the Brooklyn Dodgers with Jackie Robinson – some are very controversial. I speak of President Harry Truman’s decision to fire Gen. Douglas MacArthur after his controversial comments, and President Gerald Ford’s much-debated decision to pardon Richard Nixon. In his portrayal of these, it is hard not to see his methods of shading the stories in terms of his bid for the 2008 presidency.

In the section about confidence, McCain has a chapter focusing on Gen. MacArthur’s role in the Korean War entitled “In Command.” McCain starts by painting a very positive picture of the general, describing him as the “most self-assured of men,” and saying that that “even a cynical observer would have to concede that he was a superb general.” Popular opinion is on McCain’s side here, as MacArthur has been deservedly lauded for his commanding role in World War II. Where McCain treads into more dangerous territory is when he describes MacArthur’s actions in the Korean War.

First, he writes of MacArthur’s daring and successful amphibious attack on Inchon, South Korea. This was an attack that most thought was a huge mistake but was turned into a victory under MacArthur’s leadership. However, McCain describes how this “self-confidence and sense of invincibility was to lead to the greatest blunder of Douglas MacArthur’s career, and to his downfall.”

Additionally, McCain speaks of MacArthur’s refusal to acknowledge the possible presence of Chinese troops in Korea, who in fact numbered in the thousands. This led to the slaughter of American troops caught literally in their soon-to-be bullet riddled sleeping bags.

But this was not what led to the firing of the general. Instead, it was MacArthur’s comments on March 24, 1951, that spelled his undoing. McCain lambastes MacArthur for his decision to ignore the fact that he “had been expressly instructed to refrain from any public statements that contradicted administration policy” and instead speak his mind about the more aggressive tactics needed to win the Korean War.

One cannot help but be reminded of last year's report by Gen. Petreaus regarding America’s progress in Iraq. In almost the reverse case of MacArthur, Petreaus gave a report that matched tip-to-toe with those given by the Bush administration beforehand. McCain has expressed his outrage with the many prominent Democrats who had attacked Petreaus for being merely a pawn of the administration, and McCain has also made strong remarks against ads like those of Moveon.org that have criticized Petreaus. His treatment of MacArthur’s breaking of ranks with the presidential policy of that time suggests that McCain doesn’t believe that it is the general’s role to disagree with the commander-in-chief or the policies he suggests.

The other controversial topic McCain addresses is President Ford’s decision to pardon former President Nixon after his resignation from his Watergate crimes. The fact that this story is told in the “humility” section and the chapter is called “The Quality of Mercy” should speak for itself.

Before dealing with whether Ford was right to pardon Nixon at all, McCain discusses whether the allegation that Ford agreed to pardon Nixon if he resigned has any basis in truth. He quickly dismisses this accusation by saying that though some of Congress believed Ford had, “most members, Democratic and Republican, knew him better than that.”

Ford is described as being fast to make friends and as an all-around honest man. In fact, not a single critical word is said about Ford throughout the entire piece, and any description of anyone so slanted should make to give the reader pause. The reason Ford’s story is in the humility section is that the pardon of Nixon is here seen as a sacrifice; his aides had told him that to pardon Nixon would mean to forfeit the 1976 election, and Ford decided to pardon Nixon anyway.

In the afterword, McCain acknowledges his political side for the first time, recounting when, during the 2000 election, he “took a position [he] knew to be wrong on a controversial public issue … because [he] thought it might help [him] win the primary.” This seems to be a concession that his support of the Confederate Flag in South Carolina was not just misguided, but a deception.

All in all, Hard Call at least serves as an interesting insight to difficult decisions historical figures had to make. More interesting, however, is the book's role as a guide to what kind of decisions we might expect from a President McCain.